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Since 2015, Zika virus (ZIKV) has caused large epidemics in the Americas. Households are natural targets for
control interventions, but quantification of the contribution of household transmission to overall spread is needed to
guide policy. We developed a modeling framework to evaluate this contribution and key epidemic features of the
ZIKV epidemic in Martinique in 2015–2016 from the joint analysis of a household transmission study (n = 68
households), a study among symptomatic pregnant women (n = 281), and seroprevalence surveys of blood do-
nors (n = 457). We estimated that the probability of mosquito-mediated within-household transmission (from an in-
fected member to a susceptible one) was 21% (95% credible interval (CrI): 5, 51), and the overall probability of
infection from outside the household (i.e., in the community) was 39% (95% CrI: 27, 50). Overall, 50% (95% CrI:
43, 58) of the population was infected, with 22% (95% CrI: 5, 46) of infections acquired in households and 40%
(95% CrI: 23, 56) being asymptomatic. The probability of presenting with Zika-like symptoms due to another cause
was 16% (95%CrI: 10, 23). This study characterized the contribution of household transmission in ZIKV epidemics,
demonstrating the benefits of integratingmultiple data sets to gain more insight into epidemic dynamics.
asymptomatic infections; final size model; household transmission; Zika virus
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; CrI, credible interval; ZIKV, Zika virus.
Zika virus (ZIKV) is an arbovirus transmitted by Aedes
mosquitoes in tropical and subtropical regions (1). Discov-
ered in 1947 (2) and regularly detected in Africa and Asia
since then (3), ZIKV initially received little attention, mostly
because ZIKV infections are usually asymptomatic or do not
present severe symptoms, with Zika medical signs including
fever, rash, conjunctivitis, arthralgia, myalgia, and headache.
However, widespread ZIKV epidemics in Pacific Islands
from 2007 (4) and in the Americas from 2015 (5, 6) have
highlighted the risks of severe complications. In particular,
ZIKV infection has been associated with Guillain-Barré syn-
drome and microcephaly (7–12). Currently, there is no cura-
tive treatment or vaccine for ZIKV infection (13). To develop
effective control strategies against ZIKV, it is important to
determine where ZIKV transmission occurs. Households might
be natural targets for interventions because the abundance of
Aedes breeding sites or the mosquito’s feeding behavior and
indoor resting, and the spatial proximity between household
members might well facilitate mosquito-mediated transmis-
sion. However, a precise quantification of the contribution of
household transmission to the overall spread is needed to guide
policy.
Using data from a household transmission study where
Zika-like symptoms were monitored in household contacts
of laboratory-confirmed ZIKV cases, we characterized ZIKV
household transmission in Martinique, a French island in the
Caribbean that was affected by a large ZIKV outbreak in
2016 (14). We also investigated how such transmission stud-
ies, describing the clustering of symptomatic individuals in
households, might be used to estimate other key epidemiologic
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parameters such as the proportion of asymptomatic infections.
However, to be able to perform these assessments, we must
first address a number of challenges and limitations inherent to
our study design: the nonspecific nature of Zika symptoms
means that 1) identified secondary cases might be unrelated to
ZIKV infection; 2) fully asymptomatic ZIKV infections remain
undocumented; and 3) because households necessarily include
at least 1 symptomatic case (the index case), attack rates in the
study might overestimate attack rates in the general population.
We show how these challenges can be tackled with a statistical
and modeling framework that integrates data sets documenting
different aspects of this epidemic.
METHODS
Data
In this study, we used data from 3 different sources: a house-
hold transmission study, ZIKV testing of pregnant women,
and a seroprevalence study among blood donors.
Household transmission study. Cohort of Patients Infected
by anArbovirus (CARBO) is a descriptive and prognostic cohort
study of arbovirus infection in the French West Indies, French
Guiana, and Metropolitan France (ClinicalTrials.gov identifier:
NCT01099852) among people consulting in participating hospi-
tal centers (emergency room, full hospitalization, day hospitali-
zation, or outpatient visit) (15). FromDecember 2015 to October
2016, household contacts of laboratory-confirmed ZIKV cases
included in the CARBO cohort in Martinique University Hospi-
tal were recruited for a household transmission study. Laboratory
confirmation of recent ZIKV infection was performed by
reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction testing (Real-
Star Zika Virus reverse-transcription polymerase chain reac-
tion kit 1.0; Altona Diagnostics, Hamburg, Germany) of serum
or urine, or by direct detection of immunoglobulin M against
ZIKV in serum (French National Reference Laboratory for ar-
boviruses inMarseille, France). ImmunoglobulinM antibodies
were captured with rabbit antihuman immunoglobulin M anti-
bodies (Interchim,Montluco̧n, France).
Initially, follow-up questionnaires and clinical data were
collected on or after week 12 (week 1 corresponds to symp-
tom onset in the index case). However, the protocolwas amended
in May 2016 to ensure more thorough follow-up, with addi-
tional visits planned nearer to the day of enrollment of the
index case, on approximately day 10 and day 21. During each
visit, household contactswere askedwhether theywere experienc-
ing symptoms potentially associated with ZIKV infection such
as fever, maculopapular rash, nonpurulent conjunctivitis, arthral-
gia, and myalgia since the beginning of the ZIKV epidemic,
as well as the date of onset of any symptoms. In addition,
study teams performed telephone interviews to obtain an update
between 6 and 12 months after symptom onset in the index
case.
We refer to the initial laboratory-confirmed ZIKV case as
the index case. Other members of the household are denoted
household contacts. A secondary case is defined as a house-
hold contact with at least 2 symptoms consistent with a Zika
suspected case (acute onset of fever, maculopapular rash, non-
purulent conjunctivitis, arthralgia, andmyalgia). The secondary
clinical attack rate corresponds to the proportion of household
contacts that are secondary cases.
This study was approved by a French ethics committee
(Comité de Protection des Personnes–CPP Sud-Ouest et
Outre-Mer).
ZIKV testing results for pregnant women with symptoms.
Between February and November 2016, all pregnant women
presenting Zika-like symptoms were routinely tested for
ZIKV infection, due to the risk of microcephaly associated
with ZIKV infection during pregnancy (16). Blood samples
were tested using specific reverse-transcription polymerase-
chain-reaction testing for ZIKV (RealStar Zika Virus reverse-
transcription polymerase chain reaction kit 1.0;AltonaDiagnostics).
We analyzed the laboratory results for the subset of pregnant
women that consulted at Martinique University Hospital. This
data set brings information on the proportion of Zika-like
symptoms related to a ZIKV infection.
Seroprevalence among blood donors. We used data from
a published ZIKV seroprevalence survey among blood donors in
Martinique (17) conducted during March 9–23 and June 6–13,
2016, using samples from blood donors. Details about the design
and the laboratory tests used are published elsewhere (17) and
available inWeb Appendix 1 (available at https://academic.oup.
com/aje). This data set gives information on the expected attack
rate of ZIKV in the population.
Model
We initially adopted a classical final-size chain binomial
model for viral transmission in and out of the household (18, 19)
that describes the expected distribution of the number of infected
household members according to household size. In this model,
each household member has a probability pC to acquire infec-
tion from outside the household during the course of the epi-
demic (hereafter, “community transmission”). If an individual is
infected, there is a probability pH of vector-mediated transmis-
sion toward another susceptible household member (“within-
household transmission”). Under these assumptions, the chain
binomial model can be used to derive the expected attack rate
(defined as the overall probability of ZIKV infection during the
epidemic) as a function of household size.
In our baseline analysis we assumed that the probability of
within-household transmission was independent of house-
hold size. We also considered an alternative model using a
frequency-dependent probability of within-household trans-
mission (20–22) whereby pH decreases with household size
N according to = − (− )βp 1 expH N .
We adapted this classical model to capture the characteris-
tics of the data we used. First, we included the probability of
asymptomatic ZIKV infection pA. Because secondary cases
were not laboratory confirmed, the probability pNZ of presenting
with symptoms unrelated to ZIKV infection was factored into
the model. Finally, only households with at least 1 laboratory-
confirmed and symptomatic ZIKV case detected by surveil-
lance were included in our study. This constitutes a selec-
tion bias, given that it makes it more likely that we included
households with a large number of symptomatic ZIKV cases.
This bias was accounted for by conditioning inference on the
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probability that the household was recruited for the study.
Technical details are provided inWeb Appendix 1.
We assumed that the number of confirmed ZIKV infec-
tions among pregnant women with Zika-related symptoms
followed a binomial distribution where the probability of
ZIKV infection in a symptomatic individual was derived from
themathematical model described above (seeWebAppendix 1).
Finally, because it takes about 2 weeks for an infected
individual to seroconvert, we assumed that seroprevalence
on a given week reflected the cumulative infection attack rate
2 weeks earlier. Under the assumption that the (unobserved)
weekly number of ZIKV infections was proportional to the
(observed) weekly number of consultations for ZIKV-related
symptoms (given by surveillance data (17)), we were able to
estimate the overall infection attack rate pI from the cumula-
tive infection attack rate measured by the serological studies
for weeks 9 and 21 of 2016 and the proportion of consulta-
tions that occurred up to weeks 9 and 21 of 2016 (see Web
Appendix 1).
To assess the effect of the selection bias mentioned above,
we compared the observed secondary clinical attack rate in
recruited households (i.e., where there is at least 1 symptom-
atic ZIKV case) with that expected in a typical household,
using parameters drawn from the posterior distribution and
the distribution of household sizes in Martinique (23).
Parameter estimation
The posterior distribution of model parameters was explored
in a Bayesian framework using Markov chain Monte Carlo
sampling (24), with uniform priors between 0 and 1 for model
parameters. More details about the methods are presented in
Web Appendix 2. We used the deviation information criterion
for model comparison (25), with the smallest deviation infor-
mation criterion value corresponding to the best fit. A differ-
ence of 4 in deviation information criterion units is considered
substantial (26).
Validation of themodel and of the statistical framework
We derived the expected distribution of secondary clinical
attack rates in participating households, ZIKV seroprevalence
in both March and June 2016, the proportion of persons with
Zika-like symptoms that were infected by ZIKV, the size of
households, and number of members reporting symptoms
among recruited households. We compared these predictions
with observed values.
A simulation study was also performed to evaluate the abil-
ity of our approach to estimate model parameters (see Web
Appendix 3). We simulated 500 data sets according to our
study design, using parameter values at the posterior mean.
Our model was then used to analyze these data sets, and we
compared the estimated parameter values with input parameters.
Sensitivity analysis
We performed several sensitivity analyses to assess the
robustness of our results. Recruitment of households occurred
between December 2015 and October 2016; however, the
study documenting ZIKV infections in pregnant women
started later, in February 2016. In our first sensitivity analy-
sis, we assessed how our estimates were modified if the
analysis was restricted to this shorter time period (see Web
Appendix 4). Second, the observed distribution of house-
hold sizes is truncated for Martinique (23), with households
of size ≥6 being reported in a single category. In the base-
line analysis, we assumed these households were uniformly
distributed between sizes 6, 7, and 8 (see Web Table 1). We
performed a second sensitivity analysis (seeWeb Appendix 5)
using a geometric distribution (see Web Table 2). Finally, our
model assumes that households were followed until the end of
the epidemic. In practice however, follow-up was often a bit
shorter: Defining the follow-up as the proportion of Zika-like
cases reported in Martinique (14) at the time of the last inter-
view, 84% of households were followed for more than 90% of
the epidemic, and 16% were followed up for 80% to 90% of
the epidemic. In a third sensitivity analysis, we accounted for
this censoring in the model (seeWebAppendix 6).
RESULTS
Data
A total of 68 households were recruited between Decem-
ber 2015 and September 2016, summing to a total of 232
household members (68 index cases and 164 household con-
tacts), see Web Table 3. Households had an average size of
3.4 members (range, 1–8) (Figure 1A). Among the house-
holds, 14 (21%) had a questionnaire at inclusion of the index
case (range, 1–5 days after symptom onset for the index case),
15 (22%) at approximately day 10 (range, 6–10), 17 (25%)
near day 21 (range, 18–32), 17 (25%) near week 12 (range,
78–96 days), and 40 (59%) between 6 and 12 months after
inclusion (range, 229–374 days). The average duration of
follow-up after the inclusion of the index case was 202 days
(Figure 1B). Among the 164 household contacts, 79 (48%)
developed Zika-like symptoms. The secondary clinical attack
rate was similar, with overlapping confidence intervals, in
households of size 2 (54%; 95% confidence interval (CI):
27, 80), 3 (53%; 95% CI: 30, 75), 4 (31%; 95% CI: 4, 57),
and 5 (50%; 95% CI: 15, 85) (Figure 1C). Of the 281 preg-
nant women with Zika-like symptoms that were tested for
ZIKV infection between February and November 2016, 204
(73%) were found to be infected with ZIKV. Finally, the
seroprevalence among blood donors was 13.5% (95% CI:
6.2, 20.8) for 418 donors in March and 42.2% (95% CI:
34.9, 49.5) for 176 donors in June 2016 (17).
Transmission of Zika in the community and in the
household
Results for Zika transmission are presented in Table 1.
Posterior distributions and trace plots from the Markov chain
Monte Carlo sampling are presented in Web Figures 1 and 2,
respectively. The probability of acquiring ZIKV infection in
the community was estimated at =p 39%C (95% credible
interval (CrI): 27, 50). The probability of mosquito-mediated
within-household transmission from an infectedmember to a sus-
ceptible contact was estimated at =p 21%H (95% CrI: 5, 51).
The secondary clinical attack rate in recruited households was
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about 50%. However, once we corrected for the selection bias
(i.e., the presence of at least 1 confirmed symptomatic Zika case
seeking care in recruited households), our model predicted that
the average secondary clinical attack rate was 39% (95% CI: 31,
46) in a typical household inMartinique (Figure 1D). The overall
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Figure 1. Observed and expected statistics for households in Martinique during a Zika virus outbreak, 2015–2016. A) Distribution of the sizes of
the 68 recruited households. B) Timing of household inclusion in the survey. Each black dot indicates recruitment of a household; the dotted line re-
presents the duration the household was followed. The gray bars represent the epidemic curve for Zika in Martinique, given by the number of Zika-
like cases reported in Martinique in a sentinel network of general practitioners (14). C) Observed and expected secondary clinical attack rate in
households recruited in the study as a function of household size in the data (gray) and for the baseline (white) and the frequency-dependent (black)
models. D) Expected secondary clinical attack rate in a typical household in Martinique, as function of household size (i.e., once the effect of the
selection bias has been removed). The secondary clinical attack rate is the proportion of household contacts who exhibit symptoms. Predictions
are given for the baseline (white) and the frequency-dependent models (black). Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals.
Table 1. Estimates Obtained From theModel in the Main Analysis for Key Epidemic Features During the Zika Virus
Outbreak in Martinique, 2015–2016a
Parameter
Main Analysis
Mean Value of the
Posterior Distribution 95%CrI
Proportion of asymptomatic infections, pA (%) 40 23, 56
Probability of infection from the community, pC (%) 39 27, 50
Probability of within-household transmission, pH (%) 21 5, 51
Probability of presenting symptoms due to another cause, pNZ (%) 16 10, 23
Proportion of infections occurring at household level, % 22 5, 46
Attack rate, % 50 43, 58
Abbreviation: CrI, credible interval.
a The table showsmean (95% credible interval) of the posterior distribution obtainedwith Markov chainMonte Carlo
sampling.
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(95%CrI: 43, 58). These results imply that 22% (95%CrI: 5, 46)
of infections occurred within households and 78% (95% CrI: 54,
95) in the community.
ZIKV infection and the presence of Zika-like symptoms
We estimated that 40% of ZIKV infections (95% CrI: 23,
56) were asymptomatic and that the probability of presenting
with Zika-like symptoms due to another cause was 16%
(95% CrI: 10, 23) (Table 1).
Frequency-dependent household transmission
Under the assumption that the household transmission rate
was frequency-dependent, we estimated that 30% (95% CrI:
8, 55) of infections occurred in the household setting, com-
pared with 22% (95% CrI: 5, 46) in our main analysis (see
Web Table 4). This model predicted an average secondary
clinical attack rate of 38% in a typical household, compared
with 39% in our baseline analysis (Figure 1D). However, the
deviation information criterion was slightly higher for the
frequency-dependent model: 452 versus 451 in the main
analysis (see Web Appendix 7).
Model validation
There was a good agreement between observed values and
expected distributions of key variables (Figure 2). The pre-
dicted secondary clinical attack rate in participating house-
holds was 50% (95% CrI: 42, 58) (observed: 48%). The
seroprevalence in March and June 2016 was predicted at
15% (95% CrI: 13, 17) and 38% (95% CrI: 32, 44), respec-
tively (observed: 14% and 44%, respectively). The predicted
proportion of pregnant women with Zika-like symptoms
testing positive for ZIKV infection was predicted at 73%
(95% CrI: 68, 78) (observed: 73%). The expected distribu-
tion of the size of participating households and the number
of members reporting symptoms is given in Web Table 5,
and is consistent with the data. In a simulation study, we
showed that our approach was able to reliably estimate key
parameters (see Web Figure 3). True parameter values were
within the 95% credible intervals in 97% of the simulations
(see Web Table 6).
Sensitivity analysis
When the study period was restricted to the period from
February to November 2016 (first sensitivity analysis), 51
households remained in the data set, with a secondary clinical
attack rate of 43% and household transmissions representing
26% (95%CrI: 7, 52) of infections (seeWeb Table 7) (vs. 22%
(95% CrI: 5, 46) in the main analysis). In addition, the propor-
tion of asymptomatic ZIKV infections was slightly higher:
46% (95% CrI: 29, 62) versus 40% (95% CrI: 23, 56) in the
main analysis. Using a geometric distribution for the tail of the
household size distribution, we obtained results similar to those
obtained in the main analysis (seeWeb Table 8). Finally, when
we accounted for censorship in household follow-up, estimates
remained largely unchanged, with a slightly higher contri-
bution of households to ZIKV transmission: 24% (95% CrI:
6, 48) versus 22% (95% CrI: 5, 46) in the main analysis (see
Web Table 9).
DISCUSSION
Household transmission studies constitute an important design

























Figure 2. Expected distributions (boxplot) and observed values for the secondary clinical attack rate (defined as the proportion of nonindex
household members with Zika-like symptoms) in the participating households recruited between December 2015 and September 2016, the sero-
prevalence among blood donors in Martinique in March and June 2016, and the proportion of pregnant women presenting Zika-like symptoms who
tested positive for ZIKV infection during February–November 2016. The black dots represent the observed values in the data. The boxplots show
the 2.5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 97.5% quantiles of the distributions.
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households in the spread of a diverse set of pathogens includ-
ing influenza, measles, Ebola, Middle East respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus, and chikungunya among others (20, 21,
27–34). To our knowledge, we are the first to use this design
to obtain an assessment of ZIKV transmission in households.
The development of dedicated statistical methods was neces-
sary to properly account for specific features of the study
design, while data integration was instrumental in tackling
parameter identifiability issues.
We estimated that about a fifth of ZIKV infections in Mar-
tinique occurred in the household setting. This suggests that
vector-control methods targeting households of cases and
their neighbors might be beneficial, provided a sufficiently
sensitive surveillance system (35). However, additional ef-
forts will likely be necessary for effective control as a result
of silent transmission and reporting delays, among other fac-
tors. Interestingly, estimates of the proportion of infections
occurring in the household setting for pathogens such as
influenza and chikungunya were relatively similar to the
ones obtained here for ZIKV (31, 33).
Fifty percent of household contacts in recruited house-
holds exhibited clinical signs. However, by design, we were
more likely to recruit households with a large number of
ZIKV cases. As a consequence, secondary clinical attack
rates were likely overestimated. Our statistical model was
able to correct for such selection bias and produce more reli-
able estimates of household secondary clinical attack rates.
Our model predicted that the secondary clinical attack rate in
a typical household on the island was 39% (95% CrI: 27, 50)
on average (i.e., substantially lower than what we observed
in recruited households). This highlights the importance of
developing statistical approaches that capture the specific
features of the study design.
The proportion of asymptomatic infections (40%; 95%
CrI: 23, 56) was low compared with previous estimates from
a Yap Island outbreak (80%) (4) or among pregnant women
in French Guiana (77%) (36). However, it was consistent
with estimates obtained in a household investigation in Puer-
to Rico (43%) (37), a serosurvey in French Polynesia (50%)
(38), a survey among blood donors Martinique (45%) (17),
and the reanalysis of surveillance data from French overseas
territories (<50%) (39). A number of factors could explain
such variations. The risk of developing symptoms following
infection might vary by population, for example, because of
genetic factors. Age and sex might also affect the probability of
asymptomatic infection (37), and thus the study population can
explain some discrepancies. The variations could also be partly
explained by differences in case definitions. For example, in
Yap Island a symptomatic case was defined by an acute onset
of generalized macular or papular rash, arthritis or arthralgia,
or nonpurulent conjunctivitis (4), which is slightly different
from the definition used in the present study. Other factors
could also explain these discrepancies (e.g., the study de-
signs or the way data were collected). These factors might
have a larger effect for pathogens like ZIKV, whose symp-
toms are mostly mild. With an overall attack rate of ZIKV
infection of 50% (95% CrI: 43, 58), this study suggests that
about a third of the population in Martinique experienced
symptoms due to ZIKV infection.
We developed an extension of the chain binomial model
(18, 19) that addressed common limitations in studies based
on household surveillance, namely: 1) the lack of laboratory
confirmation for secondary cases; 2) the possibility of unob-
served asymptomatic infections; and 3) a selection bias,
given that only households with 1 symptomatic Zika case
seeking care were included in the study. Identifiability pro-
blems were overcome by integrating 2 additional data sets
collected during the outbreak: a seroprevalence study among
blood donors (17) and laboratory results for pregnant women
presenting Zika-like symptoms.
Our study has several limitations. First, the reporting of
Zika-like symptoms by household members was done retro-
spectively, sometimes several months after the household
inclusion. Thus, recall bias is likely in this study, particularly
given the mild symptoms associated with Zika disease. This
might have led to overestimating the proportion of asymp-
tomatic infections. However, our estimate of the proportion
of asymptomatic infections is at the lower end of those found
in the literature, and it seems unlikely this proportion could
be much below 40%. The imperfect follow-up of households
also means that reported dates of symptom onset in house-
hold contacts are likely to be too imprecise to be used for
inference (20, 32). As a consequence, we developed a statis-
tical framework that did not use this information but relied
only on the total number of cases per household. Second, it is
possible that symptoms reported when Zika circulation was
low were more likely related to another cause than were
those reported around the peak of the outbreak. Such dispari-
ties between households included at different times during
the epidemic could have an impact on estimates. However,
we have shown in a sensitivity analysis that results remained
stable when the analysis was restricted to the households re-
cruited between February and October 2016. Finally, for a
mild disease like Zika, with nonspecific symptoms, the defi-
nition of a symptomatic case can have an impact on the esti-
mated proportion of asymptomatic infections.
In conclusion, we estimated that up to 60% (95% CrI: 44,
77) of ZIKV infections might have led to symptoms during
the outbreak in Martinique, which implies that a third of the
island inhabitants presented symptoms due to ZIKV. We
also estimated that 78% (95% CrI: 54, 95) of infections were
acquired from the community, which can limit the impact of
within-household prevention measures. This study also high-
lights the importance of joint analysis of multiple data
streams collected during an outbreak to get more insight on
key epidemic features.
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